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Abstract 
The convention of parity of social security provision between Northern Ireland and 
Great Britain is explored as an example of how the uncodified UK constitution allows 
hasty, nominally temporary responses to chance events to gain decisive force in a 
particular field of governance or policy. As Northern Ireland’s politicians debate the 
future of parity to an unprecedented extent and Scotland looks to the development of 
a new post-referendum settlement of which, the Westminster parties have promised, 
greater devolved responsibility for “welfare” will play a part, discussion of the lessons 
of parity for those who would favour meaningful regional control of social security is 
timely. The author suggests that the key challenge is finding a settlement that affords 
economically weaker regions genuine policy autonomy without diminution of living 
standards. 
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“We Englishmen are very proud of our constitution, Sir. It was bestowed 
upon us by Providence. No country is as favoured as this country.”1 
C Dickens 
Introduction 
The oft-cited extract from Dickens above reflects one of two perspectives identified 
by van Caenegem on how constitutions come to be and develop: the providential 
interpretation and the chance interpretation.2 Dickens’s intention is somewhat 
ironic: as this paper will demonstrate, it would be difficult to present (at least some 
aspects of) the UK constitution as the outworking of “divine providence.” Instead, an 
example will be considered of how its development has more closely resembled “an 
incoherent and chaotic spectacle… where human folly and chance play a leading 
role.”3 
In the absence of a single constitutional document, constitutional law and practice in 
the UK is based on multiple sources. While much is in the form of statutes – a large 
volume of which were generated in a flurry of reform during the New Labour era4 – 
some of the most fundamental constitutional principles, arguably including that of 
Parliamentary supremacy,5 find their basis in convention. One such principle is social 
security parity in Northern Ireland. Although the region’s constitutional legislation 
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makes a somewhat vague reference to the operation of “single systems of social 
security, child support and pensions for the United Kingdom,”6 this in no way conveys 
the extent to which devolved institutions have felt constrained in the use of their 
competence for social security. Despite formal devolved competence in this field, 
policy in Northern Ireland has in practice almost invariably replicated that in Great 
Britain. The reasons for the emergence of this approach, its merits or otherwise for 
Northern Ireland and the growing prospects of change will be considered below. 
Social security parity is not merely a useful case study of the sometimes haphazard 
development of the UK constitution, but particularly merits consideration in the 
current context of uncertainty as to the future development of the devolution 
settlement. From a Northern Ireland perspective, a constitutional convention that 
appears unassailable at one point in history may at another be dropped as quickly as 
it initially became entrenched, should the political climate change sufficiently. This 
process may now have begun in respect of parity; a study of the history of the 
convention points to some reasons why it should be questioned at this particular 
moment. From the Scottish or Welsh point of view, the experience of devolved 
competence in Northern Ireland will be instructive as those regions consider their 
own constitutional futures. With Scotland likely to gain some measure of 
competence for social security in the wake of the September 2014 referendum on 
independence, policymakers there will be anxious to learn such lessons as are 
possible from Northern Ireland’s experience. Wales has thus far shown little appetite 
for control of social security, but the devolution of competence to Scotland 
combined with departure from parity in Northern Ireland would be likely to generate 
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some debate in a region whose economic circumstances are more analogous to 
Northern Ireland than are Scotland’s. 
The paper begins with a brief overview of van Caenegem’s two views of the 
development of constitutional law and how these have played out in the UK. Section 
2 then outlines the place of social security in the devolution settlement, before 
section 3 looks in greater detail at the emergence of the parity convention in 
Northern Ireland. Section 4 examines the evolution of political attitudes to parity, 
from wholehearted endorsement in the 1920s and 1930s to the more sceptical view 
of the 1980s and (in some quarters) open hostility in light of recent UK government 
policy. This raises the prospect of future departure from parity, the focus of section 
5. Finally, section 6 considers the possible lessons of the Northern Ireland experience 
for Scotland and Wales. 
1. Development of the constitution 
Van Caenegem identifies two principal approaches to the study of history. The first, 
the “providential interpretation,” views historic events as the result of “some 
intelligent design resulting in unstoppable progress.” Alternatively, the “chance 
interpretation” sees a greater role for “human folly,” “chance” and “fortuitous 
circumstances beyond human control.”7 These perspectives are as prevalent in the 
study of constitutional history as in any other field. A stable, codified constitution 
might conceivably be described as the result of some “grand design” in the sense 
that it emerges from a process of careful consideration and negotiation, although 
even in such circumstances the search for compromise between different factions 
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means the ultimate outcome may not be what any group initially envisaged.8 In the 
UK, where unusually “there is no written constitution in the formal sense,”9 the 
process can be messier still, amendment occurring through the enactment of an 
ordinary Act of Parliament, the natural evolution of the common law or the 
emergence of a new political practice that, through accident or design, becomes an 
accepted convention. 
That is not to say that constitutional change in the UK cannot flow from “grand 
design.” The New Labour government elected in 1997 took office with, and in large 
measure delivered, an ambitious programme of constitutional reform.10 However, 
even a government with a large House of Commons majority and a clear 
commitment to reform may be constrained or frustrated by what is politically 
possible or the parliamentary timetable. Hence Labour’s manifesto commitment to a 
“more democratic and representative” House of Lords stalled after only partial 
completion of its first stage, the promised removal of all hereditary peers.11 
Forethought is likely to play even less of a role in the evolution of other forms of 
constitutional law or practice. The common law evolves through judicial decision, but 
the court’s first duty is to consider the case before it on its own facts: the 
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constitutional implications of the judgment are of secondary, if any, importance to 
the decision-maker.12 This paper is most concerned with conventions. These will be 
demonstrated as emerging, in some circumstances at least, as a hasty response 
(allowing “human folly” the opportunity to play a role) to unforeseen events 
(“circumstances beyond human control”). In the case study, social security parity in 
Northern Ireland, a convention developed as an emergency response to an acute 
fiscal crisis flew in the face of successive Liberal governments’ carefully considered 
plan to keep events in and the politics of Ireland at arm’s length from Westminster,13 
but has for decades been the most important principle underlying devolved 
lawmaking in this field.14 
2. Social security in the devolution settlement 
The convention of social security parity is peculiar to Northern Ireland because of the 
unique place of social security in the region’s devolution settlement. In Wales, social 
security is not among the matters devolved to the National Assembly, while in 
Scotland, where all fields are devolved unless explicitly exempted by the 
constitutional legislation, it is among the powers reserved to Westminster. In 
Northern Ireland, where division of power is based on a similar model to Scotland, 
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social security is neither a reserved matter nor an excepted matter, and therefore 
falls within the competence of the Assembly.15  
Why social security should be treated differently in Northern Ireland is not wholly 
clear, but is almost certainly due at least in part to the different timing of the advent 
of devolution. The region has been described as the world’s first “perfect example of 
devolution,” 16 with the powers of today’s Assembly essentially mirroring those 
envisaged for an Irish ‘home rule’ parliament in 1914 and actually devolved to the 
former Parliament of Northern Ireland in 1920. At this time, the welfare state was in 
its infancy: the state pension (limited and not yet universal) and national insurance 
had been in place for only six and three years respectively in 1914, while 
unemployment insurance did not cover most manual workers until 1921.17 Clearly, it 
was not considered that control of the nascent social insurance system would 
represent too onerous a responsibility for Northern Ireland, although it was 
subsequently argued that this view was mistaken.18 The Liberal vision of “devolution 
all round” would not come to fruition until 1998,19 at which time the experience of 
Northern Ireland undoubtedly influenced the decision to retain UK government 
control of social security. 
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That regional control of social security might be somewhat qualified is hinted at in 
Northern Ireland’s constitutional legislation. This states that the Minister responsible 
for social security and the Secretary of State:  
“shall from time to time consult one another with a view to securing 
that, to the extent agreed between them, the legislation… provides 
single systems of social security, child support and pensions for the 
United Kingdom.”20  
Subsequent provisions refer to the coordination of legislation and to the making of 
“any necessary financial adjustments” that result. If the reference to “the extent 
agreed between” the Ministers appears to imply a rather flexible arrangement, its 
practical manifestation has usually been anything but. 
Given the difficulties caused by devolved control of social insurance in the 1920s, the 
decision not to devolve competence to Scotland and Wales in the 1990s and the UK 
government’s statement in 2009, when considering the future of devolution in 
Scotland, that it remained “deeply committed” to the maintenance of a single social 
security system as part of the social union,21 it may legitimately be asked why 
arrangements for Northern Ireland were never revised. A turbulent history has 
provided ample opportunity for constitutional reform, with political instability 
leading to the suspension of devolution in 1972 followed by several abortive 
attempts at restoration in revised form before the apparent return of a measure of 
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stability from 2007.22 Possibly, it was assumed that the parity principle was 
sufficiently well established to maintain the social union without the need to 
renegotiate the division of competences. Parity has indeed served this purpose for 
decades, but recent events have shown that even long-established conventions are 
not invulnerable if political opinion turns sufficiently against them. 
3. From fiscal crisis to the parity principle  
Despite the extensive powers transferred to the Northern Ireland Parliament in 1920, 
in the early period of devolution the favoured approach to a range of fields of social 
policy was to adopt on a “step-by-step” basis any new measure introduced for Great 
Britain.23 The region’s first Prime Minister stated that:  
“Since the Northern Ireland Government was set up, it has always been 
its desire to treat [everybody] in the matter of legislation and benefit, 
precisely on the same level as similar people are treated in [Great 
Britain].”24  
A key motivation was the desire of Unionist governments initially hostile to ‘home 
rule’ to facilitate future reintegration into a unitary state,25 although, as shall be seen, 
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 The search for a permanent constitutional settlement is illustrated by Northern Ireland 
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what might retrospectively be described as a vision of social citizenship at the level of 
the nation state was also influential.26  
Inclusion of social insurance in the “step-by-step” approach quickly became 
problematic. Although it was suggested during Parliamentary debates prior to 
devolution that both of the envisaged new Irish governments, particularly the 
southern government in Dublin, were likely to be chronically underfunded, the 
Government of Ireland Act 1920 provides for the transfer of monies from the 
devolved regions to central government in part-payment for the so-called “Imperial 
services,” or those functions reserved to Westminster.27 In the event, Northern 
Ireland was never in a position to pay the Imperial contribution at the level 
envisaged.28 Instead, the post-war collapse of traditional industries, soaring 
unemployment and the commitment to make unemployment insurance available on 
the same terms and at the same rate as in Great Britain brought the region to the 
brink of bankruptcy. By 1925, the unemployment insurance fund in a region whose 
entire annual budget was around £5 million was running a deficit of £3.6 million.29 
Estimates suggest the theoretically self-financing fund would have been sustainable 
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 The term “social citizenship” is associated with the writings of TH Marshall from 1949 
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up to an unemployment rate of 5.3%; the actual rate of unemployment in June 1920 
was 25.4%.30  
In 1926,31 the devolved government negotiated a bail-out and temporary subsidy of 
the fund. The UK government undertook to make good any gap between 
unemployment insurance contributions collected in Northern Ireland and 2.2% of 
total UK contributions, plus 75% of any expenditure above this level.32 This short-
term arrangement was placed on a more permanent footing in 192933 and 
periodically re-ratified thereafter.34 The aspiration of the Prime Minister of Northern 
Ireland to a settlement that would “preserve the same standard of living amongst the 
population [of Northern Ireland] as prevails on the other side” thus appeared to be 
realised.35 Today, the UK Exchequer subsidises contributory benefits by transferring 
between the national insurance funds for Great Britain and Northern Ireland such 
sums as are necessary to maintain the balance in the Northern Ireland fund at 2.84% 
of the combined total (£334 million transferred in 2012-13) and by funding non-
contributory benefits in their entirety (£2.9 billion in 2012-13).36  
Although the fiscal arrangements described were initially put in place to facilitate the 
provision of a key service at the same level and on the same terms in Northern 
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Ireland as in Great Britain, the notion that the transfers were contingent on the 
effective maintenance of a single social security system, separately administered, for 
the whole of the UK is evident from a relatively early stage.37 The position that policy 
divergence would put at risk the subvention, or otherwise incur excessive extra costs, 
has been maintained to the present by senior civil servants and Ministers.38 Although 
the devolved status of social security means Northern Ireland is not usually covered 
by the main provisions of Acts of Parliament in the field, in most cases the regional 
legislature has effectively replicated legislation passed at Westminster. Devolved 
governments’ acceptance of the notion that they had “little real decision making” to 
do in the field of social security39 extends to the vote in the final months of the 
Northern Ireland Parliament that future social security legislation for Northern 
Ireland could take the form of order in council, removing elected representatives’ 
ability to make amendments40 and leading Bradshaw to question whether devolution 
of competence has served any purpose at all.41 The suspension of legislative 
devolution for most of the period from 1972 to 2007, despite the continuation of 
administrative devolution, served to further entrench parity and convergence across 
fields in both operational and policy matters,42 although some authors argue that the 
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extent to which this was the case can be overstated.43 During periods of devolved 
government since 1998, social security Bills have tended to pass through the 
Assembly by the accelerated passage procedure, under which the committee stage is 
skipped, reducing the intensity of scrutiny, although this approach has not been 
uncontroversial44 and has been abandoned for the current Welfare Reform Bill.45 
It would be misleading to claim that an absolute parity with Great Britain had been 
maintained in every respect of social security policy in Northern Ireland. The 
reduction of family allowance payments to large families in the region in 1956 has 
been described as having “clear religious undertones”46 given the typically larger 
family size in the Catholic community at the time. Residence tests for certain benefits 
have also been more onerous, with the objective of deterring migration of claimants 
from the Irish Free State and Republic of Ireland.47 While not affecting the level of 
benefit payable, the system for recovery of debts to public authorities from benefit 
claimants in Northern Ireland allowed deduction of a higher proportion of benefit 
income than was the case in Great Britain48 and procedural differences have existed 
                                                          
43
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Ireland north and south: perspectives from social science (Proceedings of the British Academy 
’98, Oxford University Press, 1999) 128; N Yeates, E McLaughlin and G Kelly, ‘Social security in 
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in the appeals process.49 Finally, because council tax does not exist in Northern 
Ireland, neither does council tax benefit, with an additional element of housing 
benefit to cover domestic rates fulfilling the same purpose.50 While some further 
administrative differences have existed, social security legislation in Northern Ireland 
has sought to maintain conformity with the system in Great Britain by imitating the 
latest reforms there, up to and including the Welfare Reform Bill currently before the 
Assembly. 
4. Contesting parity 
As highlighted in section 3, Unionist desire for parity in social security underwritten 
by the UK government can be linked with a political aspiration for full reintegration 
into the unitary state and with the unaffordability of a shared approach to an 
economically weaker region. However, arguments in favour of the arrangement can 
also be characterised as appeals to a shared UK social citizenship. These include the 
assertion that citizens of Northern Ireland, being subject to the same tax regime as 
those in Great Britain, should enjoy the same standard of services;51 that the fluidity 
of migration between the two jurisdictions required similar levels of social 
protection, as less generous provision in Northern Ireland would result in mass flight 
to Great Britain; 52 and that the UK was simply bound to “preserve the same standard 
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of living amongst the population [of Northern Ireland] as prevails on the other 
side.”53 Parallels can be drawn with wider claims that the “social solidarity or 
fraternité” that underpins the welfare state is “national in character”54 and that 
social security benefits should be centrally controlled on cost grounds and because 
regional control would result in either migration to areas with more generous 
benefits or a “race to the bottom.”55 
Assessments of the merits or otherwise of parity in Northern Ireland have, however, 
tended to be from a more explicitly regional perspective. For the lifetime of the 
devolved Parliament after 1926, by far the dominant assessment of the 
arrangements could be characterised by that of a former Prime Minister: 
Perhaps the most important item for the people of this country is the 
agreed parity in social services and in other matters which exists between 
ourselves and our kinsmen across the water. It has meant prosperity. It 
has meant the removal of fear and want from many homes.56 
The consensus around the merits of parity begins to erode in both academic and 
political discourses during and after the unsuccessful attempt to restore devolved 
government in the 1980s. It is possible to question why social security should be a 
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special case when a shared UK citizenship has not necessarily guaranteed equality for 
residents of Northern Ireland with those of Great Britain in a range of other areas of 
social policy, including non-health social services, housing, divorce, abortion, 
homosexuality and gambling.57 Further, it has been argued that parity of output in 
social security benefits does not necessarily equate to parity of outcome in terms of 
citizens’ living standards if economic circumstances differ.58 Finally, it has been 
claimed that other aspects of the particular circumstances of Northern Ireland have 
rendered direct transposition of the approach in Great Britain inappropriate. Overall, 
the view that continued adherence to the parity principle “cannot simply be justified 
by default” has gained strength.59 
Payment of cash benefits at the same level throughout the UK has been found not to 
result in equivalence of living standards between Northern Ireland and Great Britain 
because of the former’s higher energy and food costs and less widespread 
occupational pension coverage.60 Although the House of Lords has rejected the claim 
that supplementary benefit should be paid at a higher rate in areas of Great Britain 
with a particularly high cost of living, 61 this would not necessarily preclude devolved 
legislators setting higher rates in Northern Ireland’s separate system, were it not for 
the perceived barrier of parity. Proposed reforms in the 1980s were suggested to 
                                                          
57
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conflict with Anglo-Irish Agreement provisions on “the avoidance of economic and 
social discrimination”62 by having a more negative impact on Northern Ireland’s 
Catholic community, with its higher level of benefit dependence as a result of historic 
discrimination.63 More recently, increased emphasis on lone parents’ obligation to 
seek paid employment may sit uneasily alongside Northern Ireland’s poor childcare 
provision.64 Politically, specific departures from the approach in Great Britain were 
suggested under the 1980s Assembly, including a special rate of supplementary 
benefit for the long term unemployed, a regional fuel benefit65  and changes to 
proposed housing benefit reforms.66  
Under the current Assembly, critics of parity in social security provision could initially 
be characterised as rare back-bench voices,67 although McKeever’s study of tribunal 
reform highlights potentially greater acceptance of the scope for divergence in 
administrative and procedural matters.68 Disquiet has now become more 
widespread, dividing the main parties in the devolved Executive. The Committee for 
Social Development has adopted a more proactive approach to scrutiny of social 
security Bills, no longer accepting accelerated passage, since the transfer of the 
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chair’s role from the Democratic Unionist Party to nationalist Sinn Féin.69 The 
committee’s report recommends a number of departures from the 2012 Act, 
including retention of the current rate of the disability element of child tax credit, 
consideration of a severe disability premium, possible changes to the sanctions 
regime, removal of the under-occupancy penalty in housing benefit (‘bedroom tax’) 
and extension of the duration of contributory employment and support allowance.70 
An ad-hoc committee was also appointed to consider the equality and human rights 
implications of the Bill.71 Although this concluded by majority vote that no specific 
breaches could be identified, the present author has argued elsewhere that the 
human rights compliance of some elements of the reforms can be questioned.72  
That recent UK government reforms should generate political concern in Northern 
Ireland should come as no surprise due to the greater impact there than in any other 
region. In August 2014, both the claimant count for unemployment-related benefits 
and the economic inactivity rate were higher in Northern Ireland (5.9% and 27.1%) 
than in any other UK region (average 2.9%, 22.1%), the former having been the 
highest or second-highest in the UK for 53 consecutive months. Consequently, 
changes to social security policy under both New Labour and the coalition will 
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collectively result in a per capita loss of £650 to the regional economy (average 
£470).73 However, these figures alone do not wholly explain why parity should face 
its strongest challenge at this time. Additional factors may include the shifting 
political balance of power as single-party Unionist rule has given way to power 
sharing with a place in government for nationalists and republicans. As the 
minimisation of policy differences between Northern Ireland and Great Britain was 
seen in an earlier era to serve unionist interests, so republicans might perceive that it 
is in their interests to emphasise Northern Ireland’s separateness from Great Britain 
through pursuit of policy divergence.74 Sinn Féin, which contests elections in both 
parts of Ireland, may also see resistance to “Tory cuts” more generally from within 
government in Northern Ireland75 as an electoral necessity given its criticism of 
spending cuts implemented by the government of the Republic of Ireland, where it is 
an opposition party.76  
Whatever the reasons, Ministers from the DUP and Sinn Féin have had difficulty 
reaching agreement for the return of the Welfare Reform Bill to the Assembly 
following committee stage, primarily due to a divergence of opinion as to whether 
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parity should be maintained.77 Although committee stage was completed in February 
2013, by November 2014 a date for consideration stage had yet to be set.78 The 
agreement of the two main parties on a draft Budget in November 2014 may be 
interpreted as implying that the Bill is now likely to progress, given the additional 
costs that would be incurred by further inaction, although at the time of writing this 
is not certain.79  It appears that universal credit in Northern Ireland, should full 
implementation ever come to pass, will differ operationally from in Great Britain, 
with its housing element being paid directly to landlords, greater scope for splitting 
payments to joint claimants and the option of fortnightly payments.80 More 
substantive divergence, advocated by Sinn Féin,81 has largely been resisted by the 
First, Finance and Social Development Ministers (all DUP), primarily on cost grounds, 
although recent communication with religious leaders has indicated that Northern 
Ireland will follow Scotland and Wales in devising measures to reduce the impact on 
housing benefit claimants of the new social sector size criteria (‘bedroom tax’) and 
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may limit the maximum duration of sanctions to two years, compared to three in 
Great Britain.82 
5. A new approach? 
The extent to which the merits of parity have been questioned and the current 
impasse in the Executive raise the prospect of a new approach to social security 
policy formation in Northern Ireland, under which adherence to models developed 
for Great Britain no longer dominates. Whether this would result in a genuinely new 
approach to social security in Northern Ireland is less certain: although the Assembly 
could vote in favour of divergence, this might simply take the form of the 
continuation of elements of former policy. Alternatively, abandonment of parity 
could occur by default, with failure to agree on any new legislation for Northern 
Ireland ahead of full implementation of the 2012 Act in Great Britain resulting in one 
region continuing with the pre-2012 system while others move on. Such a pathway 
would hardly be unprecedented: McEwan gives an overview of divergence resulting 
from “the Scottish Executive’s refusal to pursue some of the UK government’s more 
radical policy initiatives.”83 
What would once have been all but unthinkable must now be considered a more 
realistic proposition. It is not only in Northern Ireland that recent UK government 
policy has provoked disquiet: the Scottish government has described the 2012 Act as 
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“pernicious,” while Welsh Ministers have indicated that they, too, would favour an 
alternative approach given devolved competence.84 Regional or even local control of 
benefits that in the UK would be considered part of the social security system, 
subject to varying degrees of central restraint, is a reality in various other countries, 
as in the case of social assistance in Norway, Spain and Germany.85 Lodge and Trench 
argue that neither the “welfare unionist” desire for continued central control of 
every aspect of social security nor the “welfare nationalist” aspiration for total 
regional control of the welfare state reflects the reality of an already-well established 
tiered social citizenship within the devolutionary state or the fact that the most 
appropriate locus of responsibility may vary between benefits.86 Perhaps most 
pertinently, the major UK political parties appear less “deeply committed” to a 
continued shared approach to social security. 87 This is reflected in public 
endorsement of the devolution of an unspecified measure of competence for 
“welfare,” presumably referring (as in the Welfare Reform Acts) to social security, to 
Scotland following voters’ rejection of independence in the September 2014 
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referendum88 and in the transfer to local or regional governments of responsibility 
for support previously provided by central government through the social fund and 
council tax benefit.89 
If this confluence of events means the prospects of abandonment of parity look 
greater than at any time since 1926, the implications of such a development beg 
consideration. Most prominent, given the importance of finances in the 
establishment of and as a driver of continuing unionist support for the parity 
convention, are the fiscal implications. A previous Social Development Minister, not 
uncritical of UK government policy, has expressed concern that the entirety of the 
financial support Northern Ireland’s social security system receives from 
Westminster would be “put on the table” in the event of policy divergence entailing 
higher costs.90 While this analysis can be questioned, it does seem certain that any 
additional costs incurred as a result of a distinctive approach in Northern Ireland 
would have to be covered from regional funds; this might include additional IT costs 
if divergence occurred to the extent that shared systems could no longer be used. 
The additional social security expenditure incurred as a result of non-implementation 
of the reforms introduced in Great Britain by the Welfare Reform Act 2012 has 
resulted in £15 million from the block grant being returned to the Treasury in 2013-
14 and £87 million in 2014-14, with potential future costs estimated by the Finance 
                                                          
88
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Minister at £200 million per year if Northern Ireland continues to retain the status 
quo,91 repayments typically described in the regional media as “fines.”92 Even if the 
necessary funds to make good the shortfall could be raised in-region – perhaps 
challenging given Northern Ireland’s limited revenue-raising capacity93 – the Treasury 
has the power to reduce the block grant by an equivalent amount if it deems that 
self-financed devolved expenditure has increased “significantly more rapidly than 
comparable expenditure in England… in such a way as to threaten targets set for 
public expenditure as part of the management of the United Kingdom economy.”94 
Whether or how this power might be used in practice is unclear: the Treasury itself 
states only that in such circumstances “United Kingdom Ministers [would] need to 
take a view on whether and how to adjust this funding.”95 It seems more certain that 
any devolved level policy resulting in reduced social security expenditure would 
deliver no financial benefit to the region under present arrangements as any savings 
would be retained centrally, as with the attendance allowance payments saved in 
Scotland as a result of the introduction of (regionally funded) free social care.96 
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If, despite the considerable fiscal obstacles, the decision were taken to abandon 
parity as the overriding principle of social security in Northern Ireland, the question 
would arise of the likely direction of future policy. First, the devolved legislatures 
operate in a somewhat different legal context than does Parliament. Whereas the 
Human Rights Act 1998 enables a court to declare an Act of Parliament incompatible 
with the European Convention of Human Rights,97 but not to invalidate the offending 
provision,98 any incompatible Act of a devolved legislature would be outside its 
competence and therefore invalid.99 Although ECHR is sometimes portrayed as of 
limited relevance to social and economic rights,100 devolved institutions would be 
subject to an absolute obligation to comply with relevant provisions (notably article 
3, article 8 and P1-1) in social security legislation which does not apply to Parliament. 
These articles might point to a need to reconsider the severity of sanctions imposed 
on claimants who fail to comply with conditions attached to their benefit.101 
Devolved institutions are also subject to a constitutional obligation to comply with 
international law more generally, whilst international agreements that have not been 
incorporated into domestic law do not bind Parliament, although here enforcement 
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is in the hands of the Secretary of State rather than the courts.102 Some provisions of 
the international agreements on socio-economic rights might gain judicial weight in 
Northern Ireland in the event of the enactment of a Bill of Rights in line with the 
recommendations of the Northern Ireland Human Rights Commission,103 but for 
political reasons this currently appears a remote prospect.104 
Ultimately, any change to social security law in Northern Ireland would be the result 
of a political process. The characteristics of that process and of the actors involved 
are unique within the UK. Northern Ireland has not been associated with a history of 
“indigenous radicalism” or the “egalitarian and solidaristic myths” said to underpin to 
a significant extent the distinctive national identities of Scotland and Wales,105 nor 
does its party system match the centre left government-centre left opposition typical 
of those regions.106 For Greer, Northern Irish politics, dominated by ethno-religious 
identity, views on the constitutional status of the region and the choice between a 
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“militant” and “moderate” party on either side of the unionist-nationalist divide,107 
“are not about public policy and it shows.”108 If this is true of electoral politics, once 
in office politicians must grapple with the same issues as their counterparts 
elsewhere in the UK, but within the unique context of a consociational Executive 
whose members are drawn from (currently) five ideologically divergent parties 
representing different communal interests. The “lowest common denominator” 
thesis emphasises the difficulty of gaining agreement on any item of policy in such 
circumstances; 109 Ministers can act radically in fields not requiring legislation or 
Executive support, but where either of these is necessary a “policy impasse” 
frequently results,110 capable of resolution only through recourse to shared 
conservative social values and a focus on the “unambiguously deserving poor.”111 In 
the absence of a shared ideology to underpin a common vision, and with a decision-
making process that favours inertia, substantial innovation is rare, budgetary 
decisions are based on the political need to ensure no one party’s Ministers appear 
to be ‘losers’ and policy agendas inherited from direct rule tend to continue.112 This 
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naturally limits the potential for policy divergence from Great Britain or England 
resulting from use of initiative at regional level, but may increase the potential for 
divergence resulting from non-adoption of reforms implemented by the UK 
government.113 
6. Devolving social security: lessons from the Northern 
Ireland experience 
As Scotland contemplates a revised devolution settlement including competence for 
social security, whose knock-on effects in Wales and Northern Ireland can only be 
guessed at, it is useful to consider what lessons can be learned from the experience 
of Northern Ireland, the one UK region where social security has been a devolved 
matter for almost a century. It is immediately clear that formal devolution of 
competence does not automatically result in substantive policy autonomy as other 
factors may impose constraints on the extent to which regional innovation is 
possible.  
The primary constraint on Northern Ireland’s freedom to develop its own social 
security policy has been fiscal. The experience of the 1920s demonstrates that a 
small, economically weak region cannot hope to offer public services, particularly 
such a costly service, at the same level as other regions on the strength of its own 
resources alone. This appears to remain applicable to Northern Ireland today. The 
regional national insurance fund received a transfer of £334 million from the fund for 
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Great Britain in 2012-13, but payments still exceeded receipts by £255 million.114 
Non-contributory benefits, funded from general taxation by the UK Exchequer, 
outside the block grant for Northern Ireland, cost £2.2 billion the previous year 
compared to £79 billion for Great Britain,115 almost precisely in line with the region’s 
share of population,116 but in a context of high levels of economic inactivity, high 
security costs, low earnings and low tax revenues that contribute to the largest gap in 
the UK between receipts and expenditure. Per capita public spending was 21% higher 
than the UK average in 2011-12, with per capita revenues 22% below average.117 This 
does not necessarily apply to Scotland, where both revenues and expenditure are 
higher than average, although the position of Wales is more analogous to that of 
Northern Ireland. 
Any move towards a general devolution of competence for social security would 
therefore have to be accompanied by consideration of the most appropriate funding 
settlement in order to achieve genuine regional autonomy in the field. Current 
arrangements in Northern Ireland allow little space for significant divergence from 
Great Britain’s approach without incurring prohibitive costs. A similar approach to 
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the funding of some services nominally under regional control in Spain through ring-
fenced grants is now less widely used, in part because it raised questions about the 
extent to which regional autonomy was illusory.118 Funding the service from 
regionally raised revenue alone could hardly but result in a diminution of provision in 
Northern Ireland and Wales, although the same does not apply to Scotland. Adding 
additional monies to the block grant would be appealing to Scotland, favoured by the 
Barnett formula used to calculate allocations, and to a lesser extent Northern Ireland, 
but would leave Wales underfunded.119 Meaningful autonomy might then depend on 
the negotiation of a new, more explicitly needs-based funding model more closely 
reflecting the (not always uncontroversial)120 systems of inter-territorial solidarity in 
Spain and Germany,121 unlikely to be an easy progress given the perception of a 
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former Northern Ireland Finance Minister that within HM Treasury “there are some 
people who think that we have too much money already.”122  
If the emergence of the parity convention in Northern Ireland can be linked to a 
significant extent to fiscal problems experienced in the 1920s, the importance of a 
UK-wide conception of social citizenship – that all citizens belong to a common 
sharing community and should be guaranteed a common minimum standard of living 
– has also been demonstrated. This also remains relevant today. Although little 
relevant research has been conducted in Northern Ireland,123 literature points to a 
“devolution paradox” in Scotland and Wales whereby citizens aspire to increased 
devolved power but also favour continuation of risk pooling and uniformity in key 
services at national level.124 From this perspective, a settlement resembling that in 
Northern Ireland might be capable of gaining public acceptance: essentially the same 
system could be maintained across the UK, underwritten by central government, 
with devolved administrations able to make minor (or, perhaps in Scotland, more 
major) tweaks in accordance with regional tastes or needs, provided they are able 
and willing to meet any extra costs this entails. 
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Of course, there are alternatives – better alternatives in the view of Lodge and 
Trench125 – to the outright devolution of every aspect of social security to every 
region. In the devolutionary state the choice need not simply be between central and 
regional control of policy. Different approaches may be seen in Spain, where the 
autonomous communities may have competence for a particular field within 
parameters set by central government, as with education, or control a specific 
benefit, as with social assistance, while others remain centrally controlled.126 Lodge 
and Trench suggest a model for devolution of social security involving regionalisation 
of the most suitable benefits – notably housing benefit – with regions able to ‘top up’ 
(some of) those remaining under central control should they wish. In a devolution 
settlement that is already in many respects asymmetrical, there is no firm reason 
why social security should necessarily be devolved to every region in the same 
manner and to the same extent.127 Account could therefore be taken of Scotland’s 
stronger economic position and apparently greater political appetite for devolved 
competence.128 
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Conclusion 
The uncodified nature of the UK’s constitution means that definitively establishing 
the rules governing how the state works can be a laborious process, requiring that a 
plethora of legislation, legal judgments, non-statutory rules and conventions be 
taken into account. At first glance, the devolved regions may appear to be something 
of an exception to this rule: it is not unreasonable to describe the various devolution 
Acts passed in 1998 and 2006 as the constitutions of Scotland, Northern Ireland and 
Wales. Even here, however, the constitutional legislation does not tell the whole 
story. The history of social security parity in Northern Ireland serves to illustrate both 
the importance of non-statutory sources in telling the story of how the devolved 
regions are governed and the wider importance of conventions with no apparent 
legal status in shaping how the UK as a whole is run.  
Although it is possible to point to some legislative basis for parity in various Acts 
passed between 1926 and 1998, the impression given by the Northern Ireland Act 
1998 of a flexible, voluntary agreement that arrangements for social security in 
Northern Ireland should mirror those on the opposite side of the North Channel “to 
the extent agreed” by two Ministers in no way conveys the constraints the 
convention has placed on the region’s autonomy in this field. Subsidisation of the 
unemployment insurance fund was intended to be a short-term response to the 
acute fiscal crisis experienced by Northern Ireland in the 1920s. The agreement 
reached, to which politicians in Great Britain initially formed a less than enthusiastic 
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party,129 allowed the then-government of Northern Ireland to pursue its political 
aspiration that the minimum standard of living in that region should not fall behind 
that in the rest of the UK, pre-empting by some decades the writings of Marshall on 
the rights of social citizenship. By the time politicians and academics began to 
question whether near-absolute parity with Great Britain could in fact deliver an 
acceptable standard of living in Northern Ireland’s economic circumstances and 
against a backdrop of political violence and historic discrimination against a 
significant section of the community, the principle that parity transfers were 
intended not only to facilitate, but to require adherence to Great Britain’s approach 
had become deeply entrenched. 
That hastily cobbled together arrangements can come to take on an unforeseen 
constitutional force does not, of course, preclude the evolution of the constitution. 
The truth of the maxim that devolution is “a process and not an event”130 has been 
demonstrated repeatedly since 1998, with the devolution of major new powers to all 
three regions, a new primary legislative function for the Welsh Assembly, the 
referendum on Scottish independence and, subsequently, the ongoing renegotiation 
of the settlement for that region.131 Parity was the product of a particular set of 
political and economic circumstances and, in a very different political environment, 
now faces an unprecedented challenge. However, regardless of the future of the 
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convention, its history provides some important lessons for Scotland and Wales as 
each region considers the future of its own devolution settlement, notably that 
formal devolved control of a given field of policy does not necessarily equate to 
genuine autonomy, especially in an economically weaker region when central 
government continues to hold the purse-strings. 
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